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Trends in Communist Media

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**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
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# Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

30 JULY 1975  
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## EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

## MOSCOW HAILS "CHARTER FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" IN EUROPE

Building up to the Helsinki finale of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Moscow has hailed the "historic" event as the culmination of long efforts to achieve general recognition of postwar realities in Europe. Soviet commentators have described the conference's final document, to be signed by the leaders of the 35 participating states on 1 August, as a "charter for peaceful coexistence" between East and West Europe and an example for other areas of the world to follow. IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor and West European expert, Nikolay Polyanov, even went so far as to call the final document the "ten commandments" for peaceful cooperation between East and West.

While Moscow has taken issue with opponents of the conference--whether American, West European, or Chinese--it has consistently argued that the results of the conference are a "success" for all and are not "one-sided" in favor of the Soviet Union at the expense of the West. Typifying this approach, TASS General Director L. Zamyatin, on the 25 July Moscow radio "International Situation" program, refuted Western "propaganda" charges that the conference was "advantageous only to the Soviet Union." (Zamyatin, who has acted as Brezhnev's spokesman at recent summit meetings, is in Helsinki with the Brezhnev delegation.) Moscow has also credited "realistic-minded" leaders in the West for their role in convening the conference, achieving "successful" results, and agreeing to sign the final document at summit level, thus ending the postwar era and acknowledging the opening of a new "multilateral" phase in European diplomacy and cooperation. In this context, other than to point out routinely that Europe must now move from political detente to military detente, Moscow comment has avoided any detailed discussion of the Vienna force reduction negotiations since their 17 July recess, or any linkage of the MBFR talks to the Helsinki summit.\*

Soviet commentators have made some show of regarding all parts of the final documents as of equal importance, whether the ten political-security principles, the measures on military maneuvers, or the passages on economic and humanitarian cooperation. But Moscow has clearly placed primary emphasis on recognition of territorial status, as reflected in the Soviet interpretation of

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\* Czechoslovak comment linking MBFR to CSCE is discussed in the following article on East European treatment of the CSCE in this issue of the TRENDS.

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the principle of "inviolability" of present-day European borders. The document's passage allowing for change of borders by "peaceful means and by agreement" under international law has been passed over in silence by Moscow, and Soviet observers have particularly singled out for attack the West German CDU/CSU opposition, for its near-unanimous failure to endorse the results of the conference because of anxiety over the "German question." Moscow radio German specialist V. Zakharov, for example, remarked derisively on 26 July that the CDU/CSU leaders "have no partner in Europe except Albania."

As for the results on the Basket III issues of humanitarian cooperation and contacts, Moscow commentators have blandly claimed that the formulations in the final document were mutually agreed upon and would "open opportunities for large-scale cooperation in the humanitarian field," as PRAVDA special correspondents Ye. Grigoryev and I. Melnik put it on the 23d. However, their article reflected Moscow's strong concern over the full impact of the document in this area of East-West cooperation when it observed that this cooperation would respect the individual states' "internal" order and sovereignty.

#### EAST EUROPE LAUDS SUMMIT; CZECH MEDIA FORESEE IMPACT ON MBFR

The most noteworthy East European comment on the conclusion of the European security conference thus far is the suggestion by Czechoslovak media that this might lead to an eventual breakthrough at the Vienna force reduction talks. Other bloc comment has been confined mainly to reviewing the lengthy negotiations and to predicting that the signing of the final document would contribute to improved East-West relations on the basis of "peaceful coexistence." Maverick Romania and independent Yugoslavia, stressing their own respective roles in CSCE negotiations, have also greeted it as a significant--though limited--success. Albania, the only European country to boycott the conference, criticized it along standard lines in a lengthy 29 July ZERI I POPULLIT editorial which claimed that the final document merely recognized the fact that the continent is already divided into U.S. and Soviet "spheres of influence."

CZECHOSLOVAK COMMENT ON MBFR The suggestion that the conclusion of the conference may improve the prospects for MBFR was raised in an article titled "What Next in European Politics" under the byline "DR" in the 24 July LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE, the daily of Czechoslovakia's minor People's Party. The following day the authoritative party daily RUDE PRAVO, in an article by Jiri Martin, also noted a link between the talks

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but provided a more restrained assessment of the prospects for MBFR. Martin asserted that "although the Vienna talks do not depend on CSCE, they have one common denominator: political detente in Europe, which has scored a great success in Helsinki."

More optimistically, the LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE article, which provided the most sanguine bloc comment on MBFR since the 17 July recess, cited "unofficial conversations" to the effect that CSCE would have a "positive influence" on the arms reduction talks. Further noting the "prevailing positive atmosphere" in European politics, the article asserted that MBFR was "expected" to assume primary importance following the Helsinki summit. In particular, the article credited improved MBFR prospects to CSCE agreements on confidence-building measures and on the freer flow of information. And in a show of impartiality highly unusual for an East European newspaper, the article went on to assert that "we can note a certain modification of attitudes on both sides."

Although hopeful on the future of the MBFR talks, the LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE article acknowledged that there was no longer "hope" for a reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces in 1975. On other technical aspects of the talks, it echoed the speculation of other East European sources that the NATO states would finally introduce their "nuclear option" when the negotiations resume in September. It also noted in this connection that "certain new factors" had appeared in the U.S. "concept of nuclear war" and that tactical nuclear weapons were not covered in the SALT negotiations.

OTHER BLOC MEDIA      There have been no hints in East European comment of the earlier acrimonious divisions between East and West over the issues of freer exchange of people and information in negotiations on Basket III. The GDR's Guenter Leuschner in a 16 July Berlin radio commentary said that Basket III would serve to gage whether the West would continue to pursue cold war policies or act with a "feeling of responsibility." This was atypical, however, as most East European comment has ignored the issue, concentrating instead on the ten principles of security in Europe.

While bloc media have uniformly stressed the contribution of the bloc countries, and particularly of Moscow, to the successful conclusion of CSCE, they have also praised the role of the Western states. For example, the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG on the 15th and the GDR party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 22d respectively hailed the "statesmanlike wisdom" and "realistic" attitudes of Western governments and leaders. The United States was specifically singled out by Poland, reflecting the regime's warm reception for President Ford's

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28-29 July visit. The nonparty daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 22d praised the contributions of President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and the U.S. delegation; and party chief Gierak, in a toast addressed to the President on the 28th, expressed "full appreciation" of the U.S. contribution to the talks.

ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA      Bucharest and Belgrade both emphasized their respective successes in having nonbloc principles incorporated into the final conference document. Romanian CSCE delegate Lipatti, in a 17 July AGERPRES interview, voiced particular satisfaction that the final document had reflected repeated Romanian demands for follow-up machinery to assess compliance with the final document's provisions. Lipatti, as well as Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu in an interview published in the 29 July Paris LE FIGARO, also stressed the importance of the conference provisions for greater cultural exchanges and human contacts. Party chief Ceausescu clearly detailed Bucharest's overall assessment in an 11 July toast for visiting Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, and on several occasions since then, in welcoming the concluding session as a "positive influence" but stressing that European security would not be achieved until the blocs are dissolved, bases and troops are removed from foreign territories, and military disarmament occurs.

Belgrade, like Bucharest, has stressed the role of the smaller neutral and nonaligned states in achieving a final document reflecting compromise and "democratic" positions rather than the exclusive interests of the two blocs. Although the Yugoslav Federal Assembly on 18 July endorsed the final session as "contributing to a new climate of relations," Foreign Minister Minic's parliamentary remarks pointed up Belgrade's measured satisfaction in noting that Yugoslav proposals had been incorporated throughout the final document, "though not always to the extent we would have wished." Restraint was also reflected in a 25 July commentary in the weekly paper NIN, which noted that the conclusion of the conference would not, in fact, alter the existing situation in which Europe remains divided into heavily armed opposing blocs.



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## PEKING HAILS FORD'S RESOLVE ON U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE

A 27 July NCNA report has noted approvingly remarks by President Ford on 25 July prior to his departure for the Helsinki CSCE meeting as evidence supporting Peking's view that the meeting signals the start of a "new round" of U.S.-Soviet tension. The report, Peking's first dispatch pegged to the President's current European tour, hailed his denial of recent charges in the United States that his participation in the Helsinki summit was tantamount to acknowledging Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. NCNA subsequently reported briefly on 28 July on the President's 26-28 July stay in West Germany and visit with U.S. troops there, highlighting his statements emphasizing the continuing strong U.S. commitment to West Europe's strategic defense.

The lengthy first report on the 27th claimed that the United States intended to use the CSCE framework for "penetrating into the Soviet Union and undermining its foundation in East Europe." It cited President Ford's statement that the CSCE documents are not legally binding, that the United States will not grant tacit recognition to Soviet control in East Europe, and that Washington intends to put great stress on CSCE provisions calling for free exchange of ideas and people and for the possible peaceful changing of existing European national borders.

NCNA reported that the President voiced support for "the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of East Europe," pointedly mentioning in the next sentence that the President was to visit Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia on his current tour. The report also noted that the President "declared" that "the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and is not doing so now." (According to U.S. press reports, President Ford in delivering his oral departure statement dropped the passage in his advance text given to newsmen referring to the three Baltic states, and omitted the advance text's specific reference to support for aspirations for freedom in "East Europe," saying instead that the United States supports such aspirations "everywhere.")

Peking predictably played up President Ford's stated resolve to maintain NATO solidarity and allied positions on Berlin and Germany, and the report underlined its treatment of the U.S. competition with Moscow by reporting also on press conference remarks by Secretary Kissinger on 25 July complaining of Soviet policy in the SALT and MBFR talks and in Portugal.

Peking's treatment of U.S. intentions is consistent with its recent propaganda line that the superpower rivalry in Europe has

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reached a "new stage," despite outward signs of East-West relaxation, as the United States has pulled back from overextended positions in Asia following its setbacks in Indochina and shifted to contend more forcefully against recent Soviet inroads in Europe. Peking's coverage of the Ford trip thus far recalls its unusually favorable and extensive treatment of the President's trip to West Europe to attend the May 1975 NATO summit. In the past, Chinese treatment of a U.S. Presidential visit abroad had usually been confined to a single NCNA dispatch covering the entire itinerary of the trip, which was released following the President's return to Washington.\*

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\* For a discussion of Peking's latest comprehensive assessment of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe, see the TRENDS of 25 June 1975, pages 3-4. For Peking's treatment of President Ford's West European visit, see the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 6-7.

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## U. S. - POLISH RELATIONS

## POLAND WARMLY HAILS FORD VISIT, STRESSES SOVIET TIES

Polish media have hailed President Ford's 28-29 July visit to Warsaw as a tribute both to Poland and to the good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about by detente. Both the leaders' speeches and Polish media comment have pointed out that the visit was sandwiched between the U.S.-Soviet joint space venture, on the one hand, and the Helsinki summit of the CSCE on the other. A similar stress on the linkage between U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S.-Polish relations was made during former President Nixon's visit to Warsaw in 1972, which came right after the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit. Protocol on both occasions similarly reflected Polish deference to Moscow. In 1972, Nixon rated a formal but stiff reception by state leaders Jablonski and Jaroszewicz; this time Ford got the more personal style of greeting favored by Brezhnev, with party chief Gierek doing many of the honors.

Predictably, the comment has stressed the historical ties between Poland and the United States. There have been many references to the great number of American citizens of Polish ancestry, to the Polish contribution to U.S. independence and to U.S. participation in World War II. Gierek, in his 28 July toast, characterized U.S.-Polish relations as "favorable" and undergoing "dynamic growth," while Jaroszewicz, in a toast the following day, portrayed them as "broader and richer as well as friendlier and warmer today than at any time in the past." Particular stress was placed on Gierek's October 1974 visit to the United States, which government spokesman Janiurek described on the 27th as opening up a "qualitatively new stage" of relations.

These positive appraisals of relations with the United States were complemented by reaffirmations of Warsaw's close ties to Moscow. In discussing Poland's postwar development, for example, Gierek on the 28th paid recognition to the assistance of "our unfailing friends, above all the Soviet Union." And Jaroszewicz on the following day underscored the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations to U.S.-Polish relations, asserting that Poland, "as a close ally of the Soviet Union, linked by relations of friendship and fraternity, firmly supports the Soviet-U.S. dialog and cooperation. . . ." Emphasizing the point in the 25 July ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Adam Wysocki stressed that the improvement in U.S.-Polish economic relations could not have taken place without detente.

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Both before and during the visit President Ford was repeatedly praised for his "personal" and "consistent" contribution to detente. In addition, the Polish leaders and media comment often cited Secretary Kissinger's foreign policy role. The centerpiece of the favorable publicity was an article by Grzegorz Jaszunski in the 22 July ZYCIE WARSZAWY, which provided an unqualifiedly positive appraisal of the Ford Administration's foreign policy and portrayed in glowing terms President Ford's prospects for reelection. In particular, the President was praised for issuing an early invitation to Gierk to visit the United States, for his role in bringing about the Vladivostok arms agreement, and for accepting the "inevitable" communist victories in Indochina.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### MOSCOW OBSERVERS SEE LIMITS ON SINO-U.S. COLLABORATION

Political observer Aleksandr Bovin assured viewers of an 18 July Moscow TV roundtable program that China's ability to upset detente was "fairly limited," adding that "realistic" politicians in the West understand this. Answering a viewer who asked if true detente was possible when "such a large state as China does not support this policy," Bovin discounted China's disruptive potential on the ground that Peking had no viable alternative to offer. He acknowledged, however, that Peking represented a "serious destabilizing factor" in the international situation and that "some people in the West" would like to take advantage of that. Similarly, recent articles in Soviet academic journals have argued that Washington's current foreign policy operates on the assumption that Peking's continuing dispute with Moscow can be exploited for U.S. advantage.

Efforts by Soviet commentators to downgrade China's diplomatic and military potential have developed as Moscow has found it necessary to disabuse internal critics who saw rapprochement between the United States and China as a potential threat to Soviet detente policy. In a television program last January, PRAVDA's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov had defended the Vladivostok SALT accord against those who were worried about the limitations in the face of unrestrained Chinese capability, particularly given the possibility of U.S. military assistance to Peking. Zhukov reassured his listeners that the danger in such a course was appreciated "on the other side of the ocean," if only due to the uncertain internal situation in China.

Despite such reassurances by Bovin and Zhukov on television--where sensitive issues on occasion are treated more frankly than in the printed media--Soviet media in general have devoted increasing attention to Peking's emerging alignment with the "most reactionary elements" in the West, in an attempt to discredit China's revolutionary credentials. Moreover, analyses of U.S. foreign policy by Soviet scholars have betrayed concern in Moscow over Sino-U.S. contacts by observing that Washington counts on a certain amount of continuing Sino-Soviet tension to facilitate its "triangular diplomacy." A review of A. Doak Barnett's recent book on China, Uncertain Passage, in the latest issue of the Soviet journal PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST (No. 2, 1975), noted that the author, "reflecting the views of influential circles in the United States, welcomed an easing of Sino-Soviet tension but was negative toward the renewal of Soviet-Chinese friendship on a

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broad scale." In the February issue of USA, Boris Zanegin, a member of the Institute of the USA and Canada, had concluded that Peking's alleged obstructionism in the Sino-Soviet border talks "suits those forces in the United States which see the PRC as a component of the 'balance of power,' in other words as an object of foreign policy manipulation."

#### PEKING DERIDES MOSCOW OVER U.S.-USSR SPACE FLIGHT

Peking's sole comment on the recent U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz space flight, a 25 July NCNA article, has criticized Moscow's "all-out propaganda" over the venture, alleging that Brezhnev desperately needs such outward demonstrations of detente in order to continue to deceive the world's peoples and shore up his sagging political fortunes at home.

The NCNA article claimed that Brezhnev's detente efforts are full of "holes" through which people see more clearly the "danger of Soviet revisionist social imperialist expansion." The article also made a rare Chinese reference to "contradictions within the Soviet revisionist ruling clique," claiming that Brezhnev put great personal stress on detente displays like the space flight in order to "look good" prior to the anticipated Soviet 25th Party Congress, to "preserve his rule" which has allegedly come under a cloud because of recent "snags" in East-West relations, and to lay the necessary groundwork for his upcoming trip to Washington where he hopes to "swagger about."

NCNA muted its criticism of the U.S. role in the space flight and followed a carefully differentiated approach in treating the two superpowers. While the USSR was repeatedly branded as "Soviet revisionism" or "social imperialism," the United States was mentioned in straightforward fashion without any pejorative epithet. Moscow was depicted as an aggressive power whose military spending has "reached an all-time high," while the United States was seen as understandably "unwilling to stay behind" in the face of Soviet provocations. Peking underscored its anti-Soviet bias by giving special attention to alleged Soviet efforts to use the flight to "steal U.S. secrets," noting in one instance that U.S. space personnel visiting the USSR in preparation for the flight had discovered Soviet electronic eavesdropping on their conversations.

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## PEKING ACCUSES MOSCOW OF INCITING CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

PRC Vice Premier Ku Mu on 23 July broke Peking's silence on the armed fighting in Angola among competing liberation organizations, blaming the Soviet Union for "perpetrating subterfuges and trying by all means to stir up internal conflicts" in Angola for its own hegemonic ends. Ku's remarks, at a banquet welcoming a Malagasy Government economic delegation to Peking, have been followed by several NCNA commentaries sharply critical of Moscow's Angolan policy and represent a Chinese rejoinder to recent accusations by the Soviet media that Peking has encouraged attacks by one liberation group, the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA), against the others.\*

In his banquet speech Ku noted that the three Angolan liberation organizations--the FNLA, the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), and the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA)--had recently confirmed their intention to work together toward independence, and he expressed Peking's conviction that superpower "sabotage and intrigue" could be overcome if the groups strengthened their unity. Without specifically mentioning the USSR, Ku added that "a superpower" which he said was stirring up Angolan internal conflict for its own advantage was merely "lifting a rock only to drop it on its own feet."

A 26 July NCNA commentary sharply accused Moscow of attempting to sabotage the landmark accord worked out among the three rival groups in Nakuru, Kenya, on 21 June by publicly classifying the groups into "revolutionary, nonrevolutionary and even counter-revolutionary" categories and by secretly shipping arms to "stir up civil war" among the rival insurgent movements. It avoided specifically mentioning which liberation group Moscow supports against the others, however. NCNA further charged that Moscow, like a "thief crying 'stop thief,'" has set its "propaganda machines in motion" to slander China and "other African countries" over Angola and it reaffirmed Peking's "consistent, resolute support to the Angolan people's efforts to fight for national independence in unity."

NCNA on 27 July accused Moscow of interfering in the 18-28 July OAU Council of Ministers session in Kampala, Uganda, with the intention of rendering "the Angolan issue even more complicated by dividing African leaders." It reported favorably on the 28th

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\* Recent Soviet media charges that Peking is fostering civil war in Angola are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 July 1975, pages 20-21.

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that the OAU ministerial council session had proposed for approval by the OAU's 12th summit conference opening on 28 July that the three Angolan liberation organizations cease hostilities immediately and attend the conference to discuss the Angolan question.

BACKGROUND A 22 January 1975 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial commemorating the 15 January signature of the Angolan independence agreement in Lisbon by all three Angolan liberation groups had warned against the dangers of superpower "sabotage" and stated that "the unity of the Angolan liberation organizations . . . is an important guarantee for implementing the agreement and winning independence in the days to come." Peking has since taken pains to maintain friendly relations with the three Angolan groups, each of which has sent delegations to Peking this year. Both the UNITA delegation led by general commander Samuel Chiwale in late March and early April, and the FNLA delegation led by Front Politburo member Hendrik Vaal Neto in mid-July, had "cordial and friendly" conversations with PRC Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, according to NCNA. The agency reported that the MPLA delegation led by Politburo member Lucien Lara in late May and early June had a "cordial and friendly" conversation with lower-ranking Vice Premier Chi Teng-kuei. Peking had not previously reported the outbreak of fighting between the Angolan groups either before or since the signing of the Nakuru agreement on 21 June, avoiding the issue even in NCNA's factual 22 June report on the signing of the agreement.



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## U. S. BASES IN TURKEY

### MOSCOW RESTRAINED ON TURKISH TAKEOVER OF U.S. INSTALLATIONS

Moscow has thus far offered limited, low-key comment on the U.S. House of Representatives' 24 July defeat of a bill partially lifting the embargo on U.S. arms to Turkey and Ankara's 25 July announcement suspending the activities of all U.S.-Turkish "joint defense installations." A 25 July TASS report on the House vote noted that President Ford had expressed "deep disappointment" over the "negative decision" which could "irreparably damage" vital U.S. national security interests, including the United States' "usually excellent" relations with Turkey. A PRAVDA dispatch from Istanbul, reported in a Moscow Turkish-language broadcast on the 27th, noted that the Turkish action would place under Turkey's control all U.S. bases in the country apart from NATO's Incirlik airbase. PRAVDA observed that the main aim of the U.S. embargo was "to force the Turkish Government to change its Cyprus policy," but that in Turkey the American action was considered a manifestation of U.S. displeasure at Turkey's inclination to pursue an independent foreign policy.

A subdued immediate reaction was to be expected from Moscow, with the base imbroglio coinciding with the Helsinki summit meeting capping the European security conference (CSCE). A Turkish-language commentary on the 27th in fact drew an "instructive" lesson from the U.S. arms embargo, pointing out that one of the CSCE principles envisaged respect for the sovereignty of all states on an equal basis, while the U.S. Congress' decision made Turkey, an independent and sovereign state, "dependent on the laws of another state." The broadcast pointed out that despite strong criticism in Turkey, implementation of the "new status" for U.S. bases--announced by Ankara on 17 June, pending a 30-day period for opening of talks on new conditions for the installations--had been postponed until after the Congressional decision on the embargo.

Shortly after the June announcement, brief IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA articles, as well as scattered comment broadcast in Turkish, had underlined "growing criticism" among Turkish press and public opinion with the government's "policy of 'cautious accommodation.'" Turkish papers and political personalities, according to Moscow, were calling for immediate dismantling of the bases, abrogation of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements, and adoption of a foreign policy based on Turkey's national interests.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW COOL TO EGYPTIAN ACTIONS OVER UNEF EXTENSION ISSUE

Egypt's approval of extending the UNEF mandate for three more months, announced by Foreign Minister Fahmy the day before the mandate's expiration on 24 July, has drawn only curt Soviet praise. PRAVDA's international review column on the 27th referred briefly to the decision as a display of Egypt's "good will and respect for the United Nations." Moscow's correct-but-cool reaction presumably reflects its reluctance to comment favorably on what was essentially a pressure tactic by Egypt in its current U.S.-assisted negotiations with Israel on a new Sinai disengagement agreement. Egypt's responsiveness to such negotiations has been a source of friction in Soviet-Egyptian relations over the past year.

Following Egypt's declaration on the 16th that it might not renew the UNEF mandate, Moscow's sparse comment on the issue had been mixed and to some extent tailored for specific audiences. Thus, Moscow's Arabic-language broadcasts presented Egypt's hesitation over renewing the mandate as fully justified, given Israel's persistent "intransigence and procrastination" in withdrawing from occupied Arab territories and recognizing Palestinian rights. Items carried by TASS and Moscow's domestic radio, however, seemed indirectly critical of Cairo's threat not to renew the mandate. TASS on the 17th reported Secretary Kissinger's remark at a Milwaukee press conference the previous day that the Egyptian position "will complicate the efforts for achieving peace." On the 18th TASS indirectly praised the UNEF record by pointing to the UN Secretary General's report on UNEF activities from 13 April to 15 July, which noted that "the ceasefire was preserved and no significant violations in the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement zone were recorded" and which concluded that further peace would depend on progress toward a Mideast settlement and creation of an atmosphere contributing to such efforts.

TASS's account of the 22 July Security Council discussion of the UNEF mandate issue noted that 12 council members, including the Soviet Union, had voted for approval of a message to President as-Sadat calling for prolongation of the mandate. But the TASS account made no mention of any remarks by the Soviet delegate during the debate. In reporting the council's approval of a three-month extension "in view of Egyptian Government consent," TASS on the 25th did summarize the Soviet representative's statement, concluding pointedly that the USSR calls for "serious preparations" and speediest resumption of the Geneva conference. In a variation of

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last April's formula tying any partial measures to the Geneva forum, the TASS account added that the Geneva conference could solve all matters related to final and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem "and to separate measures in the framework of an overall settlement."\*

Continued Soviet dissatisfaction with Cairo's diplomacy was reflected in remarks by a participant on Moscow radio's 20 July observers' roundtable who, while critical of Israel's "haggling" over withdrawal from Arab territories, reminded his audience that although Egypt was refusing to renew the UNEF mandate, it did not intend to renounce its policy of cooperation with the United States to arrange a new "partial settlement" with Israel and that, on the contrary, "Egypt continues to trust in the possibility of American cooperation in such a settlement."

\* The linkage of partial measures with the Geneva conference was first set forth in the communique on Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahni's 19-22 April visit to Moscow, discussed in the 23 April TRENDS, pages 8-12.

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## K O R E A

### DPRK SPOKESMAN REJECTS U.S. PROPOSAL TO DISBAND UN COMMAND

North Korea has conveyed in a rather unusual and low-keyed manner its negative reaction to a 27 June U.S.-drafted UN resolution that proposes disbanding the present UN Command in South Korea if alternate arrangements for continuing the armistice agreement can be devised. The Pyongyang media's first direct response to the U.S. proposal came in the form of remarks by Korean Workers Party Political Committee candidate member Kim Yong-nam on 27 July, while meeting with Japanese newsmen accompanying a Liberal Democratic Party delegation to the DPRK. Kim labeled the draft resolution an attempt by the United States to keep its troops in the ROK by "changing the UN Forces beret for another" and said the North would "determinedly oppose" such a move.

Kim's remarks were transmitted by KCNA's English service and the Pyongyang domestic radio on 28 July.\* The North Korean versions of Kim's remarks seemed designed to stress the unofficial nature of the interview, noting that Kim was asked for "his opinion" on various issues, including the draft resolution. The Korean versions reporting the meeting identified Kim only as a "member" of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central People's Committee and a deputy of the Supreme People's Assembly, whereas Japanese press accounts identified Kim as chairman of the commission and head of the party's international department.

Earlier signs portending a negative DPRK response to the U.S.-cosponsored resolution had appeared in Kim Il-song's remarks in mid-July to a Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation, reported by Japanese but not North Korean media, and in a JSP-KWP joint statement carried by KCNA on 18 July. The JAPAN TIMES reported on the 16th that Kim had told the JSP group the resolution was a "conspiracy aimed at perpetuating the division of the peninsula." In the joint statement the JSP side took a similar line, denouncing the resolution as a "crafty move to justify occupation of South Korea by U.S. troops and create 'two Koreas.'" Kim Yong-nam's more recent remarks did not tie the draft UN resolution to any U.S.-inspired "two Koreas" scheme.

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\* It is unusual, if not unprecedented, for DPRK media to report the remarks to foreign journalists of any North Korean official other than Kim Il-song himself.

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Included in the Pyongyang radio version, but omitted from KCNA, was Kim's assertion that withdrawal of U.S. troops was the "first prerequisite and basic requirement for settlement of the Korean question." It is not unusual for the KCNA English version of DPRK statements to be softer in tone than the version presented to the domestic audience. According to a 27 July KYODO account of the meeting, Kim called for a U.S. troop pullout at the same time the UN command was disbanded, a demand not included in either Korean version.

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## VIETNAM

### SAIGON FRONT ORGANIZATION HOLDS CONGRESS, ELECTS OFFICERS

A congress of the Saigon municipal organization of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, convened in the southern capital on 27 and 28 July, represented a major step toward organization of the noncommunist population in South Vietnam. Presumably the NFLSV in the future will play a key role--like the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) in North Vietnam--in coordinating the activities of mass organizations and mobilizing the populace to implement party policies. While the top officers elected at the Saigon congress were either open communist party members or figures long identified with the communist cause, the new Saigon NFLSV committee also includes a substantial representation of third force personalities. It seems likely that the national NFLSV committee will eventually be similarly expanded to assimilate cooperative noncommunist elements and create the image of a more broadly based organization.

The political report to the congress outlined the NFLSV's role in general terms, noting that it had "united broad sections of the people and mobilized all the working people and patriotic people of all strata to positively contribute their part to quickly stabilizing the situation and normalizing living conditions, and to resolutely smash all schemes of rebellion of the counterrevolutionaries . . . ." The appeal from the new Saigon NFLSV Committee expressed confidence that the people of Saigon, "led by a broad and stable Front and by a vanguard party," would overcome all "difficulties" and achieve "great success." It spelled out the duties of different elements in the South, among other things calling upon workers to take steps to strengthen an "independent and sovereign economy" and urging that farmers intensify production, improve techniques, and "gradually engage in the path of collective work."

The Saigon NFLSV congress was first mentioned in a 17 July LPA report that a committee to prepare for the conclave had met two days earlier and concluded that the upcoming congress would "bear an important and necessary significance to meet the needs of the new situation." Beginning on 28 July Saigon radio broadcast extensive reports on the congress, with briefer accounts carried by other North and South Vietnamese media. (Saigon radio's regular shortwave broadcasts went off the air on 23 June, when the radio reduced its original transmissions to mediumwave broadcasts,

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heard only in the capital area, and a single daily shortwave dictation-speed broadcast. Since 29 July, however, Saigon radio has resumed using shortwave transmitters to carry its regular domestic service programs, following the broadcast schedule which had been announced on 19 June.)\*

KEY SPEAKERS        The congress was chaired by Nguyen Van Chi,  
 AT CONGRESS        identified as the former chairman of the Saigon  
                      People's Revolutionary Committee, who also  
 delivered the inaugural speech and was elected chairman of the city's  
 NFLSV committee. Chi, who is said to be a professor and to have  
 also been active in the resistance against the French, had been  
 elected to head the Saigon People's Revolutionary Committee at a  
 meeting outside Saigon at the end of May 1969. He was identified  
 as the committee chief by communist media as late as October 1970,  
 and he may have relinquished his post only recently in anticipation  
 of the formation in coming weeks of a new revolutionary committee  
 to provide a civilian administration for Saigon. (In this regard,  
 it may be notable that media reports on the congress have not  
 indicated that any role was played by representatives of Saigon's  
 Military Management Committee. The military committee, however,  
 has been mentioned in other propaganda.)

The political report to the congress and appeal by the new Front committee were both read by Ta Ba Tong, who was reelected at the session as a vice chairman of the city NFLSV committee. The congress also heard brief remarks by the chairman of the national NFLSV organization, Nguyen Huu Tho, and by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, who had formerly headed the Saigon NFLSV Committee. (Apparently no new Saigon committee head was selected after Phat moved on to his PRG post in June 1969, and it thus seems likely that no Saigon NFLSV congress has been held since that time, although the current congress is said to be the third such meeting.) Saigon radio also indicated, without providing any substance, that several other reports were delivered at the congress, including one by a representative of the Saigon party committee.

The radio carried an extensive account of a speech at an evening meeting on the 28th by the North Vietnamese representative at the session, Nguyen Van Hieu, the chairman of the Hanoi Municipal VFF Committee. Notably, delegates to the congress from Hue included

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\* See the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, page 3 for further information on recent Saigon radio behavior.

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not only representatives of that city's NFLSV committee, but also one Hoang Lan,\* who was identified as a vice chairman of the Hue city VFF--suggesting that some coalescing of the VFF and the NFLSV may already be taking place in the northern section of South Vietnam.

The new Saigon NFLSV Committee chairman, Nguyen Van Chi, has not been identified in the media as a communist, despite his long association with the party's cause. However the first vice chairman elected at the congress is an open party official, Nguyen Ho\*\*--a member of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Party Organization. Another of the vice chairmen is the head of the Saigon Women's Union, Bui Thi Nga, who is the wife of PRG President Phat. The list of vice chairmen also includes several ostensible noncommunist third force representatives, including the radical student leader Huynh Tan Mam and former National Assembly Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan.

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\* A Hoang Lanh, presumably the same individual, was identified by the Hanoi paper HANOI MOI on 20 May as chairman of the Hue Municipal Revolutionary People's Committee and chairman of the Hue Municipal Military Management Committee.

\*\* Nguyen Ho, who is also chairman of the Saigon Federation of Liberation Trade Unions, has variously been identified in the media as Nguyen Van Ho, Nguyen Hoi, and Nguyen Van Hoi. For further background, see the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, page 3.

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# CHINA

## PEKING USES PLA TO INSURE ORDER, PRODUCTION IN CHEKIANG

Peking has acted decisively to solve factional problems in long-troubled Chekiang province, issuing a central directive that has sent large numbers of PLA troops into Chekiang industrial plants and shaken up the provincial leadership hierarchy. Party provincial First Secretary Tan Chi-lung, who was retained in his post, announced the new "important instructions on the work of Chekiang province issued by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee" to a meeting of provincial cadres on 22 July, according to a 23 July Hangchow radio broadcast. Similar meetings were held the same day by the provincial military district and Hangchow municipality, according to the provincial radio on the 24th. The report of the military district meeting noted the PLA's pledge to "give full scope" to the role of the army as a pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat under "the centralized leadership of the party."

Prior to the formal announcement of a new central directive on Chekiang, the Hangchow radio on 21 July had already announced that over 6,000 members of a local PLA unit "would go by groups to participate in labor on the frontline of industrial production, beginning 19 July." The report praised local "commanders and fighters" for participating in productive industrial labor in several Hangchow factories, claiming that the troops strengthened unity between the army and the people, thus increasing production.

On 25 July the Hangchow radio reported that even more troops were being sent into local factories, revealing that the party committee of the Chekiang Military District (MD) had sent over 4,500 troops "to take part in productive labor in a number of plants" in Hangchow. While the PLA has never totally withdrawn from civil administrative tasks it inherited during the cultural revolution, the large number of troops now being sent to Hangchow factories to safeguard production is highly unusual and serves as a measure of the intense factional struggles there.

The troops, sent into nine factories on 22 July, were led by Chekiang's newly appointed MD commander Chang Wen-pi. Chang had served as Anhwei's first political commissar in the stormy years of 1967-68 and presumably he assisted Politburo member Li Te-sheng, who was then commander of the Anhwei MD, in restoring order among Anhwei's feuding Red Guard factions at the peak of the cultural revolution. Chang then moved to Peking, serving as head of the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric Power until the Fourth National People's Congress last January.

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Chang's appointment as military District commander, revealed in the 23 July Hangchow cadres meeting report, was only one of several new assignments apparently designed to end factional strife. Seven new additions to the provincial party committee, including Chang as secretary, were revealed in the broadcast. Leadership changes were also evident in the Hangchow municipal party committee, where new men were named to the top two spots on the committee. The broadcast called upon all local cadres "to take immediate action to implement" the center's instructions and it specifically urged leading cadres to criticize factionalism, strengthen party leadership, and promote unity and production.

Peking's use of troops to crack down on the widespread factionalism in Chekiang has triggered pledges from local army, party and production units to adhere more closely to party discipline. The Chekiang radio on 24 July, for example, reported on a meeting of PLA units stationed in Hangchow at which it was "vowed to resolutely accept the centralized leadership of the party" and to "further develop the national economy." Another broadcast on 24 July reported that party members in Hangchow had criticized "bourgeois factionalism" and had agreed to make sure that "every action they take abides by the party's command, and that they would do whatever the party directs them to do." And a 27 July report on a textile plant in Hangchow claimed that the directives from Mao and the party central committee have "swept all corners of the plant . . . like a gust of strong east wind," resulting in a 10 percent increase in output compared with the production level for mid-July.

PRC media have referred to central instructions on factional problems in specific provinces in the past. In May 1974, for example, when factory production declined in some areas because of excesses in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, central calls were publicized for two provinces--Kiangsi and Kweichow--to avoid debilitating factional disputes. Troops were not sent to basic production units at that time, however, but steps were taken to halt all actions that would weaken unified party leadership or threaten production.

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### CHINA REPORTS RAPID GROWTH OF FACTORY UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

Recent Chinese media reports pegged to this year's anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's 21 July 1968 directive that technical training institutes should be collocated within production units have provided some specific figures on what NCNA on 20 July called the current "boom in the development of factory-run workers colleges." NCNA claimed that the number of worker colleges in Liaoning has jumped from 59 last year to 200 this year, lauded the First Ministry of Machine Building for increasing its number of worker colleges from 150 to 300 in the past year, and credited Shanghai with having established more than 360 factory-run colleges for workers. NCNA praised many worker-students, skilled in using both "pen and hammer," for having introduced technical innovations after graduation when they returned to their original production units and linked "manual work with mental work." The report also revealed that many worker colleges go beyond teaching just technical skills, offering courses in politics, literature, art, history and philosophy in order to "help attract more workers to study."

Several provincial radios have also reported on their success in developing new schools for workers. Canton radio on 21 July claimed that the number of 21 July universities in Kwangtung has increased from six in the second half of 1974 to "about 100 now." Wuhan radio claimed on 21 July that the province had established over 90 worker universities with over 7,000 students enrolled, "more than three times the number at the end of last year." And in Kwangsi, Nanning radio on 22 July reported on a local rally held to mark the opening of 16 new worker universities.

A number of other provinces have reported their total number of worker universities and numbers of students attending them. Using figures which seem to exclude most part-time students, Anhwei radio on 20 July reported that the province now had "nearly 50" worker universities with over 3,000 students; Kirin radio on 21 July reported over 60 such universities; Kiangsu radio on 22 July stated that the province now has 146 of the 21 July colleges with 6,800 students; Yunnan radio on the 22nd claimed 53 worker universities with 1,700 students; and Peking radio on 24 July noted that the municipality now had 135 worker universities with 10,000 students.

Although the number of students attending worker colleges is increasing, their number apparently remains much smaller than the number attending regular colleges. Numbers for comparison purposes are rarely discussed in the media, but Harbin radio on 21 July stated that the 17,800 students attending 333 worker universities in Heilungkiang account for "20 percent of the number of students attending regular institutes of higher learning" in the province.

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Pressure to train the large numbers of technical experts China will need to meet its own goal of joining the front ranks of the developed nations by the end of the century may be responsible for an apparent trend toward full-time, longer-term education in the worker college system, thus moving away from the original idea of short-term, part-time training for workers. Kunming radio on 22 July revealed that of Yunnan's 53 worker universities, seven were of the "work-study type," one sparetime, and 45 full-time. Similarly, provincial radio reports on worker colleges routinely stress that the length of schooling for workers can be as long as two or three years or as short as several months, but longer periods of training seem to be favored. For example, a Hangchow broadcast on 24 July reported that the length of schooling at a new worker college in a local turbine plant was "tentatively set for two years."

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## U S S R

### COLLECTION OF BREZHNEV SPEECHES ON THE ECONOMY PUBLISHED

Moscow radio on 28 July announced the publication of the first volume of a two-volume collection of Brezhnev speeches on the Soviet economy. This is the first time that Brezhnev has thus been presented as an economic authority, although he has had volumes published on a wide range of other subjects: agriculture, ideology, foreign affairs, party organizational work, and youth. It is the latest in a series of indications that Brezhnev has been trying to assume a more prominent role in the management of the economy, a sphere of authority that has long been associated with Kosygin.\*

This will be the ninth collection of Brezhnev speeches, the others being:

- + A general collection of his speeches, the first two volumes of which were issued in early 1970, a third in late 1972, and a fourth in March 1974;
- + A collection of speeches on youth, issued in early 1970;
- + A collection of foreign policy speeches, issued in late 1972;
- + A collection on party organizational activity, issued in mid-1973;
- + Another collection on foreign policy, issued in the fall of 1973;
- + Another collection on youth, issued in early 1974;
- + A collection on agriculture, issued in February 1974, and in an expanded edition in June 1974;
- + A collection on communist education and ideology, issued in June 1974.\*\*

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\* For background on Brezhnev's October 1974 address to the Council of Ministers on economic questions and other signs of encroachment on Kosygin's sphere, see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 23-24, and the 23 May 1975 TRENDS Supplement "Soviet Factions Renew Debate over Economic Priorities."

\*\* For a comparison of the Brezhnev and Khrushchev collections, see the 10 April 1974 TRENDS, pages 18-20.

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The more recent Brezhnev volumes (volumes three and four of the general collection, the second edition of his agricultural collection, and the ideological volume) contain subject indexes, apparently designed to encourage more frequent references to Brezhnev statements by regime speakers and writers.

Kosygin has had one general collection of his speeches published, a first edition signed to press on 20 August 1974 in 200,000 copies, and a second edition signed to press 4 December 1974, also in 200,000 copies. (Brezhnev's volumes have been issued in editions ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 copies.)

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## NOTES

PRC EARTH SATELLITE: On 27 July Peking NCNA announced that China had launched its third earth satellite into orbit the preceding day. The previous two Chinese satellites were launched in April 1970 and March 1971, before the fall of Lin Biao seemed to signal a decrease in PRC allocations for advanced weapons. The NCNA announcement credited the achievement to the "entire party, the entire army, and all the people" and, as in the previous announcements, noted that the achievement was in accordance with Mao's principle of maintaining national independence and self-reliance. Congratulations to those directly involved in the project were delivered in the name of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council and the party Military Commission, a change from previous launchings when only the Central Committee was cited. In another change, workers were told to continue to exert themselves in order to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and to develop China's science and technology, omitting the former injunction to "make greater contributions to humanity."

MOSCOW ON PORTUGUESE TRIUMVIRATE: Continuing its support for the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (MFA) Assembly's 25 July decision to concentrate "all political and military power" in a triumvirate of three generals--President Costa Gomes, Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves, and internal security forces commander de Carvalho. In a favorable report from Lisbon broadcast on Moscow's domestic service on the 26th, TASS correspondent Kovalev noted that the MFA decision aimed at "raising the authority of revolutionary rule and strengthening revolutionary legality," and observed that the creation of the triumvirate "meets the wishes of the people" and the interests of strengthening MFA unity. Another Kovalev dispatch on the 27th said the decision to create a "strong political leadership" had been welcomed by democratic parties, the trade unions, and broad masses of the working people, and approved by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). A PCP statement reported by TASS on the 27th seemed something less than enthusiastic, however, in observing that the MFA "decisions on organizational questions" would "facilitate" the revolution's tasks. According to TASS, the PCP said "a way out of the present crisis" must be found through a policy directed at defending and consolidating the gains of the revolution, and it called for "tough measures" in defense of the revolution. Perhaps obliquely underlining the failure of Socialist Party demands for the resignation of the prime minister, Moscow has pointed to what PRAVDA on the 26th called a growing movement "expressing complete faith in and approval of" Goncalves. And commentator Viktor Shragin, on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable on the 27th, remarked that the "democratic

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public of Portugal decisively supports the prime minister." Notably, in reporting the selection of the three-man leadership, Kovalev's 26 July dispatch said the Portuguese people, in numerous demonstrations and gatherings in the last few days, had expressed their solidarity with the MFA and President Costa Gomes, General de Carvalho, and "Prime Minister and--as he is called here-- 'Comrade' General Vasco Goncalves."

CASTRO SPEECH: In a low-key speech commemorating the 22d anniversary of the Moncada Barracks attack signalling the beginning of the struggle against the Batista regime, Prime Minister Fidel Castro focused on Cuban domestic issues. Offering a pledge of Cuban support for Portugal--represented at the ceremonies by General Otelo de Carvalho, head of the security forces--Castro said the country's problems were "immense" but that "the revolutionary movement is assured." He added that "the Portuguese revolutionary movement can count on our people's most resolute support under all circumstances." Castro ignored U.S.-Cuban relations and made no mention of the ongoing OAS session which was meeting to amend the Rio Pact and remove the 1964 sanctions against diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. In tracing the history of Cuba's socialist development, Castro also omitted the elaborate praise of the Soviet Union which had characterized, for example, his 1973 speech. Instead he noted that the Cuban revolution had succeeded "because our cause was just, because it was based upon the objective laws of society and history." Speaking of domestic developments, Castro as usual praised at length the province in which he was speaking (Las Villas), and discussed the sugar industry and the importance of "that beautiful banner of communist labor, which is voluntary labor" in furthering the sugar harvest and in building socialism. He said little about the first congress of the Cuban Communist Party, scheduled for December, but he did note that "the most fundamental matters for the next five years will be considered at the congress."

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# A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 JULY 1975

<u>Moscow (2628 items)</u>			<u>Peking (911 items)</u>		
Soyuz-Apollo Space Mission	(33%)	22%	USSR	(2%)	8%
[Brezhnev Greetings to Ford]	(--)	3%]	[Superpower Rivalry in Space]	(--)	6%]
European Security Conference	(--)	6%	European Security Conference	(7%)	5%
China	(6%)	5%	Malagasy Economic Delegation in PRC	(--)	3%
Cuba 26 July Anniversary	(--)	5%			
Polish Liberation 31st Anniversary	(--)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.